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Europe and the Christian Democracy 
Movement: A Once and Future Hope? 
by 
Allan Carlson, Ph.D. 
This essay is odaptedfrom a lect11re pres nted to the Witherspoon Fellowship 
of the Family Research ouncil, Washington, D.C., Ju/ ; 20, 2005. It appears 
here with permission. The author has served a Distinguished Fellow in 
Family Policy at the Family Research Council and is president of the Howard 
Center, in Illinois. He is the author of Fractured Generations: Crafting a 
Family Policy for Twenty-First Century America and The Swedish 
Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population 
Crisis. 
In August, 1992, during his address to the GOP National Convention, then 
presidential candidate Pat Buchanan delighted his supporters and appalled 
progressive Republicans when he stated: 
My friends, this election is about much more than who gets what. 
It is about who we are .. . There is a religious war going on in our 
country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to 
the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself. 1 
The term 'cultur war' o often heard in our political di c ur e 
today popularly dates f rom thi peech. Yet the phra e , true orioin 
aclllally reache, ba k ver a century and aero the Atlantic. During the 
1870 Lh then-new German Empire launched a broad a au lt on religi u 
lib rty and fam ily au ton my, a campaign called kulturkampf (u·an lated 
'cultuJe w~u·' ). Perhap the mo t important if unintended , re ult of thi 
original 'cultUJe war' was to encourage a . till amorphou. p litical 
movem nt, called hri tian Democracy in Germany and el ewbere .in 
Europe. Thi . exp riment in applying Chri tian principle o popular 
modern governan e developed its own hi tory of triumph and tragedy; and 
it offer J • on for American also trying - now in the 2 J t Century - to 
apply Chri tianity to modern democratic p Iitics. 
94 Linacre Quarter! y 
A Legacy of the French Revolution 
It is said that the 20th Century Chinese Communist leader Zhou En-
Lai (1898-1976), when asked what the impact of the 1789 French 
Revolution had been on human affairs, replied: "It's too soon to tell." 
Actually, it is unclear to whom and just when Zhou said this. One 
source says it was to the Archduke Otto van Hapsburg in 1948; another 
source says to Richard Nixon in 1972; another to England's Tony Benn in 
1975; and still another to a French journalist in 1989. The latter could be 
called miraculous, for Zhou had been dead for thirteen years by then. 
Perhaps Zhou, living and dead, has simply prattled this observation out to 
every Westerner that he has met. 
All the same, his answer rings true. The revolutionaries of 1789 
unleashed passions and ideas that continue their work into our time. Many 
of them directly target religious and family relations, including the leveling 
idea of equality, the divorce revolution, secular liberalism, sexual freedom, 
state-centered education, and communism. The French Revolution also 
defined our modern political vocabulary: the labels "liberal," "radical," 
"socialist," and even "conservative" all derive from that time of fennent 
(for example, it was books by Edmund Burke and Louis deBonald written 
in reaction to the French Revolution that first defined modern 
conservatism). 
So, too, for Christian Democracy which also rose as a somewhat 
delayed response to events in France. As a prominent early Christian 
Democrat explained, 1789 marked "the birth year of modern life," which 
he also described as "the catastrophe of 1789."2 Indeed, one of the most 
successful Christian Democratic parties would take the strange name, The 
Anti-Revolutionary Party, in the late 1870s, and would retain it until just 
two decades ago. 
The Christian Democratic Platform 
Authentic Christian Democracy, I hasten to add, has not been simply 
another name for "conservatism." Unlike European conservatives, the 
Democratic Christian goal has not been to defend the remnants of the old 
feudal order, nor existing class structures, nor persons of wealth. Nor has 
Christian Democracy simply been the "rural" or "country" party, defending 
the interests of small farmers while ignoring the urban, industrial order. 
Instead, the movement should be seen as a distinctly Christian 
response to modernity, one with its own platform. To begin with, Christian 
Democrats have understood the French Revolution as unleashing an 
"appalling anti-Christian world power which, if Christ did not break it, 
would rip this whole world forever out of the hands of its God and away 
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from its own destiny." According to these partisans, the seculmism 
spawned by the French Revolution produced a "system of modern and 
almost incomprehensibly diabolical paganism." The movement has also 
held that "it would be utterly absurd for a person to take ... a confession of 
Christ on [his or her] lips and ignore the consequences that flow directly 
from it for our national politics."3 
Moreover, Christian Democracy has fonnally opposed economic 
materialism, in both its socialist and liberal capitalist manifestations. In 
this view, Europe's early 20th-Century disorders arose from the 
"exaggerated liberal-capitalistic economic order" of the prior century. As 
the Christian Democratic writer Maria Meyer-Sevenich explained: 
... they [Marxism and fascism] are nothing but powerful 
reactionary movements, grown out of the native soil 
[Mutterboden] of the same liberal-capitalist thinking.4 
Speaking in 1946, Josef Andre offered a Christian Democratic 
interpretation of the meaning of the Nazi defeat in World War II: 
The materialistic view of history is now at an end. What Hegel, 
Darwin, Haeckel, Nietzsche and Karl Marx strove for, each from 
his own field of expertise, has been historically overtaken and 
destroyed with the National Socialist Zeitgeist.5 
Christian Democracy has provided instead, a spirit-centered, Christ-centered 
world view that would build distinctive political and economic orders. 
Notably, Christian Democracy has tood ·B r organic society. The 
legacy of the French Revolution in both poljtics and economic wa a quest 
for uniformity, which meant the uppression of div r ity tbe denjal of 
"everything fresh and natural." Christian Democrats have held that the 
spontaneous structures of human life - villages, towns, neighborhoods, 
labor associations, and (above all) families - need protection from the 
leveling tendencies of modernity. Only through these organic structures, 
they have maintained, can the human personality thrive. As the French 
philosopher Etienne Gilson explained: 
From his birth to his death, each man is involved in a multiplicity 
of natural social structures outside of which he could neither live 
nor achieve his full development... Each of these groups 
possesses a specific organic unity; first of aJl, there is the family, 
the child's natural place of growth.6 
Christian Democrats have insisted that such groups pre-exist the state. That 
is, the law does not create families and towns; it "finds them." Accordingly, 
Christian Democrats have favored tax benefits and state allowances to support 
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marriage and the birth and rearing of children as recognition of this prior 
existence of families. 
As analyst Guido Dierickx explains, Christian Democrats have also 
viewed the family as holding both instrumental and intrinsic value. On the 
one hand, the family is the vehicle for the regeneration of all society: 
The Christian Democrats view the (core) family as a privileged 
opportunity to implement their social... principles. They want the 
citizens to adapt their private lives to demanding interpersonal 
relationships . Family life, especially the traditional family life of a 
married couple with several children, is a first embodiment of 
such relationships in other sectors of society. 7 
On the other hand, Christian Democrats also have used public policy tore-
functionalize, and so strengthen, families. When they: 
... would like to entrust more health care and other social service 
duties to the family, they do so not just to alleviate the burden of 
the state bureaucracy or of the Ministry of Finance, or to improve 
the quality of the service rendered to the aged, the young and the 
sick (though this too is a major consideration), but first and 
foremost because they hope to strengthen the family. [They 
believe that] the contemporary family is weakened by the loss of 
social functionality. 8 
Similarly, Christian Democrats have sought to funnel additional 
modern governmental services through other "organic" structures as well, 
notably "non profit" and religious agencies. For example, in the nations of 
Germany and the Netherlands, where Christian Democratic influence has 
been decisive, state sectors now allocate nearly 70 percent of gross 
domestic product. However, only 10 percent of this has been controlled by 
the central government. Instead non-profit agencies - particularly those 
with religious ties - have provided the largest share of program 
implementation. 9 
Two Paths to Christian Democracy 
In its purest form, Christian Democracy has also aimed at Christian 
political unity. The Enlightenment of the 18th Century, which spawned the 
ideological side of the French Revolution, had itself emerged largely in 
revulsion over the religious wars of the prior, or 17th century. In that 
intolerant, bloody era, Catholics and Protestants battled against each other. 
Millions died in this Christian civil war. The modem Christian Democracy 
movement has consciously worked to transcend theological differences 
between Catholic and Protestant by focusing on the common enemy - the 
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"appalling anti-Christian world power" - and by building a common 
social-political program. All the same, there were distinctive Roman 
Catholic and Protestant paths to this end. 
The Catholic effort had to overcome the view that the Church of 
Rome, from the fall of Napoleon in 1815 through the revolutions of 1848, 
was reactionary, favoring the oppression of the people, opposing their 
democratic aspirations, and ignoring the new problems posed by industrial 
society. 10 It was in the German states that the revolutionary year 1848 saw 
creation of "The Catholic Federation of Germany." Designed to protect 
Catholic rights in any future German union, this "Catholic club" became 
the "Fraction of the Center" in 1858, and eventually The Center Party. 
While open in theory to non-Catholics, the Center Party focused first and 
foremost on defending Catholic authority, rights, and church schools. 
However, the young Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel, Baron 
von Ketteler, began to shape a more interesting and ecumenical social 
Catholicism. During the Catholic Congress of 1848, he offered a toast to 
"the plain people" of Germany and declared that "as religion has need of 
freedom, so does freedom have need of religion": in that time and place, 
these were unexpected, radical statements. During the 1860s, Bishop 
Ketteler turned to the "social question." He denounced the development of 
what he called "capitalist absolutism," called for the creation of Christian 
labor associations to protect workers, and urged political reforms that 
would increase wages, shorten the working day, and prohibit the labor of 
children and mothers in factories. 11 
In 1871, following German victory in the Franco-Prussian War, the 
German Empire took form. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck immediately 
launched his Kulturkampf At one level, this "culture war" aimed at 
reducing the influence of the Catholic Church in a predominantly 
Protestant empire. The Jesuit religious order, for example, was banned. At 
another level, however, all Christians faced new restrictions. An 1871 law 
banned all clergymen from discussing political issues from the pulpit. 
Other laws gave the German state more control over the education of all 
clergy, created a special secular court for legal cases involving clerics, and 
required state notification of all clerical employment. In 1875, the Empire 
required that all maniages be civil- not church- ceremonies. In response, 
Catholic political action through the Center Party accelerated. This 
"Culture War" lasted until 1878, when Bismarck decided that the greater 
internal threat to the German Empire came from the socialists. 
The "social Catholicism" of Bishop Ketteler and the foray into electoral 
politics represented by Germany's Center Party came together in Pope Leo 
XIII's 1891 encyclical, The New Age (Rerum Novarum). This remarkable 
document testified to Roman Catholicism's willingness to meet the promise 
and problems of industrialization with an affirmative Christian alternative 
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both to the laissez-faire of classical liberalism and to socialism. Arguing 
that "the present age handed over the workers, each alone and defenseless, 
to the inhumanity of employers and the unbridled greed of competitors," 
Leo rejected the wage theory of liberalism that considered that wage just 
which resulted from a free contract between employer and worker. Leo 
repudiated socialism with even greater fervor, terming it "highly unjust" 
because it injured workers, violated the rights of lawful owners, perverted 
the functions of the state, and threw governments "into utter confusion." 
Instead, Leo turned to "the natural and primeval right of marriage" 
and to the family - "the society of the household" - as the proper 
foundation for social and economic theory. The right of ownership, for 
example, while bestowed on individuals by nature, was necessarily 
"assigned to man in his capacity as head of a family." Similarly, Leo 
declared it "a most sacred law of nature that the father of a family see that 
his offspring are provided with all the necessities of life .. . " In the natural 
order, he continued, it was not right "to demand of woman or a child what 
a strong adult man is capable of doing or would be willing to do." Women, 
he affirmed were "intended by nature for the work of the home ... the 
education of children and the well-being of the family." Consequently, Leo 
concluded, the principle underlying all employer-worker contracts must be 
that the wage be at least "sufficiently large to enable [the worker] to 
provide comfortably for himself, his wife, and his children ... " 12 This was 
the goal of the "family wage." 
Christian Democracy from the Catholic side is, in fact, best 
understood as Rerum Novarum put into action. Indeed, in 1901, Leo issued 
another encyclical, Graves de Communi Re, which openly embraced the 
"Christian Democracy" label. Contrasting this movement with the 
principles of Democratic Socialism, Leo stated: 
... Christian Democracy, by the fact that it is Clu·istian, is built, and 
necessarily so, on the basic principles of divine faith, and it must 
provide better conditions for the masses, with the ulterior object 
of promoting the perfection of souls made for things etemal. Hence, 
for Christian Democracy, justice is sacred; it must maintain that 
the right of acquiring and possessing property cannot be impugned, 
and it must safeguard the various distinctions and degrees which 
are indispensable in every well-ordered commonwealth. 13 
In 1906, Germany's Center Party launched a great debate on its 
future. Julius Bachem's article, "We Must Get Out of the Tower" ("Wir 
muss en aus dem Turm hera us"), argued that the Party should cease being 
strictly "Catholic" and should increase its Protestant membership as the 
only way to break out of perpetual minority status. Action toward this end, 
however, was deferred. 
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Abraham Kuyper 
The Protestant strain of Christian Democracy is strongly associated 
with the Dutch pastor, editor, and politician Abraham Kuyper. The 
Netherlands, it is important to remember here, was- almost uniquely- a 
nation born out of religious sentiment. For 80 years (1566-1648), the 
Dutch Calvinists had fought the Catholic Hapsburgs for religious - and 
ultimately political - freedom. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was, 
most assuredly, a nation with the soul of a church (and a Protestant one 
at that). 
The armies of the French Revolution, however, swept over the 
Netherlands, unleashing there the "anti-Christian world power." The 
necessary task became the rebuilding of a Christian nation. In 1879, 
Kuyper transformed a confessional Calvinist political movement into 
the Anti-Revolutionary Party. He saw the French Revolution as 
marking: 
... the emergence of a spirit that stole into the historical life of 
nations and fundamentally set their hearts against Christ as the 
God-anointed King ... In place of the worship of the most high 
God came, courtesy of Humanism, the worship of Man. Human 
destiny was shifted from heaven to earth . The Scriptures were 
unraveled and the Word of God shamefully repudiated in order to 
play hostage to the majesty of Reason. 14 
Kuyper also raised his banner against the intrusion of the industrial 
principle into local, organic communities. Although writing in 1869, he 
could have had Wal-Mart in mind when he said: "The power of capital, in 
ever more enormous accumulations, drains away the life blood from our 
retail trade. A single gigantic wholesaler swallows up the patronage that 
formerly enabled any number of stores to flourish." 15 What he called "the 
iron steam engine" even endangered the family: 
No longer should each baby drink warm milk from the breast of 
its own mother; we should have some tepid mixture prepared for 
all babies collectively. No longer should each child have a place to 
play at home by its mother; all should go to a common nursery 
school. 16 
All the same, Kuyper emphasized that there was no going 
backwards. Rather, those who believed in Christ must embrace democracy, 
the spirit of which would only grow. They must "position themselves 
courageously in the breach of this nation" and "prepare for a Christian-
democratic development of our national government." 17 
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through social bodies such as family, local community, and labor 
association. He called for creation of a revolutionary Christian party, one 
"hard," one worthy of Christ, one "radical" in its social-economic vision.19 
In 1943, a young Catholic philosophy student and disciple of 
Mounier, Gilbert Dru, drew up a Manifesto for postwar Christian 
Democratic work. He emphasized the transforming quality of true 
Christian action: the whole person must become engaged, not just as a cog 
in a party machine, but as a militant working to build a new France on 
radical Christian principles. A year later, Dru paid for this Manifesto with 
his life, being shot by the German Gestapo in Lyons.20 
The further elaboration of Christian Democratic doctrine came 
primarily from two journalist-philosophers, Etienne Gilson and Etienne 
Borne, both writing for the joumal, Aube. They rejected the atomistic 
individualism of the 19th Century "bourgeoisie" which, they said, had 
exhibited a "narrow," self-centered outlook and had shown "an 
indifference toward basic institutions such as the family." These writers 
also scorned the Socialists and Communists for their "materialism" and 
their hostility toward revealed religion. Indeed, bourgeois liberalism and 
communism could be seen as "two facets of a single error." The task now 
facing Western Civilization was to find a middle way between bourgeois 
liberalism and collectivism.21 
A second plank in the new Christian Democratic platform was that, 
while the movement and party would be openly Christian, it would be 
neither clerical nor strictly Catholic. Following the anti-religious darkness 
of the Nazi conquest of Europe, this movement would instead forcefully 
seek to unite Catholic and Protestant believers and sympathetic others -
Jews and agnostics- in a defense of Christendom as a civilization with 
religiously infused values.22 
Christian Democracy also sought to deliver both freedom and 
justice. As Etienne Borne explained: 
Freedom without justice is artificial, deceptive and hypocritical; it 
can be used to justify the mechanism of the free market and the 
servitude of the proletariat; such freedom is, in fact, the antithesis 
of freedom. Likewise, justice without freedom leads to tyranny 
and to the totalitarianism of Soviet communism or Fascist 
corporatism. 23 
To accomplish these tasks - this is, to reconcile individualism with 
community and to deliver both justice and liberty- the French Christian 
Democrats gave priority to the defense of natural social groups. As Bome 
put it: "A people is not really a people and certainly does not live in 
freedom unless the natural social groups which compose it accept each 
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-other, and unless the state recognizes their differences and ensures that 
their interests are represented."24 This would be true democratic pluralism. 
Notably, these new Christian Democrats also renounced the 
patriarchal, paternalistic family system of old Europe. The father-
dominated family could not be reconciled with "personalism," they said. 
Post-war Christian Democrats held that women should enjoy equal civil, 
legal, and political rights . At the same time, restoration of the family did 
mean: that control of education should be returned to parents; that 
motherhood and childhood should enjoy special protection by the state; 
and that heads-of-households should receive a "family wage," so that 
mothers might be empowered to remain home with their children.25 
Human Rights also became a defining Christian Democratic 
concern, but with a special twist. Where secular views of the French 
experience relied on an evolutionary understanding of rights, the new 
movement emphasized the rooting of human rights in the Creation itself in 
the Natural Law. Such rights were "inviolable" and "innate" because their 
fountainhead was God Himself. Bearing a healthy suspicion of the state, 
Christian Democrats embraced Human Rights in order to protect "the 
natural rights of each individual" and of "natural social groups" from the 
overweening power of government.26 
Out of this genuine intellectual ferment, Christian Democracy took 
political form as the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (or MRP), which 
became part of the French governing coalition of 1946.27 In the 
Netherlands, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, in alliance with the Catholic 
Party, reclaimed governing power the same year. Christian Democratic 
parties then won important elections in formerly fascist Italy (1948) and 
West Germany (1949). 28 
Large Effects 
The effect was large. Christian Democracy created the spiritual and 
political conditions that made possible rapid European economic renewal. 
It also laid the foundations for the building of welfare states that were 
broadly supportive of families organized on the male breadwinner, female 
homemaker, childrich model. This Christian Democratic moment had two 
other important results. First, the dream of European Union was largely 
born among the postwar generation of Christian Democratic leaders, 
notably Robert Schumann of France, Conrad Adenauer of West Germany, 
and Alcide de Gaspari of Italy. The early treaties creating the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 1952) and the European Economic 
Community (Rome, 1957) focused ostensibly on economic questions . 
However, their animating spirit came from a dream to revive Cluistendom; 
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-indeed, to build a democratic version of the old Holy Roman Empire on the 
mins of a continent recently ravaged by war. 
The other enduring legacy of post-war Christian Democracy was the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The key architects of this 
document were: Charles Malik, an Arab Christian Democrat from Lebanon, 
who served in 1948 both as secretary of the Commission on Human Rights 
and as president of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council; and Rene 
Cassin, a French specialist in international law who, while himself Jewish, 
was highly sympathetic toward postwar Christian Democracy.29 As one 
historian has phrased it, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
"largely identical" with the worldview expressed in Christian Democracy.30 
Specifically, we find in Article 16(3) the affirmation of "natural" 
social institutions: 
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the state. 
The word "natural" comes straight out of the Christian Democratic 
lexicon. Even the use of the word "society" here as distinct from and prior 
to "the state" is a Christian Democratic marker. 
In Article 25, one finds support for family social rights, with 
particular emphasis on a "family wage": 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and his family, including, food, 
clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.. 
Other provisions declare that men and women have "the right to 
man·y and found a family" [Article 16(1)] and that "motherhood and 
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance" [Article 25(2)]. The 
Universal Declaration also affirms parental rights: "Parents have a prior 
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children" 
[Article 26(3)]. 
Even the term "equality," subject before and later to so much 
mischief, finds rich meaning in the Universal Declaration through 
"personalist" conceptions of "the right to life" (Article 3), "the dignity and 
worth of the human person" (Preamble), and "endowed" human nature: 
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All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood (Article l). 
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Indeed, the only core Christian Democratic theme not present is an 
open affirmation of the Deity of Creation. Several members of the drafting 
committee, led by Charles Malik, sought inclusion of this idea. But in the end, 
they agreed to more universal language that implied, rather than named, God.31 
"Silent Revolution" 
Yet, as early as the 1950s, Christian Democracy as a vital worldview 
entered another period of crisis. The youthful excitement, energy, and 
sense of positive Christian revolution evident in the 1940s dissipated. In 
France, Christian Democracy's main political vehicle, the MRP, lost 
support to General Charles de Gaulle's new party, the RPI (Ressemblement 
du Peuple Francois) and by 1958 had disappeared altogether. In Italy and 
West Germany, meanwhile, Christian Democratic parties consolidated 
their hold on power at the price of their vision. By the early 1960s, they 
were increasingly pragmatic and bureaucratic, self-satisfied defenders of 
the status quo. Ambitious office seekers, rather than Christian idealists, 
came to dominate the party. Movements for "moral and political renewal" 
became simply mass parties of the right-of-center.32 When a new "crisis of 
values" hit Europe with particular force in the late 1960s, the Christian 
Democrats were unprepared to respond. They appeared by then as old and 
discredited guardians of a new kind of materialism, the very opposite of 
what the movement's visionaries intended.33 
Indeed, it is now clear that a "silent revolution" in values set in 
among Europeans after 1963. It can be seen in the shift away from values 
affirmed by Christian teaching (such as "responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, 
and sanctity of long-term commitments") and toward a strong "secular 
individualism" focused on the desires of the self. 34 Family life became a 
casualty. Surveys of European youth in the 1970s and 1980s showed that 
they "appear to be extending non-conformism with respect to abortion, 
divorce, etc., to parenthood as well," agreeing by large majorities with 
statements such as "children need only one parent" and "children are no 
longer needed for personal fulfillment." 
In explaining this value change, another commentator has pointed to 
the swift legalization of abortion and to "the falling awareness" among 
Europeans "of the dignity of every person, even the old and disabled." He 
added: " ... naked individualism and unbridled libertinism have become 
increasingly widespread in recent years ... Female emancipation, which is 
well advanced, ... appears to be headed in this direction," as well. 
Meanwhile, the courts and public opinion grew tolerant of sexual 
deviance.35 Understood in terms of worldview, such changes symbolized 
the new triumph of an old foe- "the anti-Christian world power" originally 
unleashed in 1789- over Christian Democracy. 
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New Hope from the East? 
All the same, the 1990s marked another resurgence of Christian 
Democracy, albeit in unexpected places. For instance, a Swedish election 
in 1991 brought the Christian Democratic Social Party into Sweden's 
Parliament for the first time, where it joined the governing coalition. Over 
the next three years, the party successfully pushed for the teaching of 
Christian values in the state schools and for a new social benefit to go to 
stay-at-home parents. 
More dramatically, Christian Democratic parties emerged in all of 
the East European nations freed from Communism in 1989-90. In Poland, 
to choose one example, the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc came to power 
in 1997, with a campaign manifesto declaring: 
We can build a modern, just, and self-sustaining sovereign state; a 
state founded on patriotic and Christian values, on love and 
freedom. These values have formed our core identity for a 
thousand years. 
In Rumania, the National Peasants' Christian Democratic Party won that 
nation's November 1996 election. Christian Democratic parties have also 
been part of ruling coalitions in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, and Latvia. 36 
Family issues loom large in these nations and on Christian 
Democratic agendas. The legacy of Communism combined with the 
arrival of Western-styled social libertarianism to produce a devastating 
effect on East European family structures. Since 1990, divorce rates have 
soared; marriage rates have fallen sharply; birth rates have plummeted. 
Indeed, in 2005, the list of the ten nations with the world's lowest total 
fertility rates includes Latvi~ (1.26), Poland (1.24), Slovenia (1.24), the 
Czech Republic (1.20), anti Lithuania (1.19) . In response, Christian 
Democratic parliamentarians from six "new member states of the 
European Union" - namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Estonia - met last year and issued their "Family First 
Declaration." They fonnally endorsed the March 2004 "Mexico City 
Declaration" of The World Congress of Families, and they pledged: 
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We will coordinate our efforts on behalf of the traditional family, 
marriage and the intrinsic value of each human life so that the 
future Europe is not associated any longer with the culture of 
death, institutionalized egoism and population decline, but with 
the preservation of religious, ethical and cultural values that 
enhance virtuous life in all relevant aspects. Healthy family life 
enhances true and ordered liberty and limits the power of the state. 
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This document also endorsed other principles central to the Christian 
Democratic worldview: 
• "Procreation is the key to the survival of the human race." 
• "Parents possess the primary authority and responsibility to 
direct the upbringing and education of their children." 
•"Good government protects and supports the family and does not 
usurp the vital roles it plays in society." 
• "Sexuality exists for the expression of love between husband 
and wife and for the procreation of children in the covenant of 
marriage." 
If Eastern Europe - indeed, if Europe as a whole has any viable 
future, it lies along these Christian Democratic lines. 
Lessons 
There has never been a serious Christian Democratic Party in 
America. This seems due, in part, to the mechanics of our single-district 
electoral structure, which strongly favor a two-party system with each 
party in turn serving as an ad hoc coalition of interest groups. Christian 
Democratic parties -with their more coherent worldview - thrive best in 
places that use proportional representation. 
Also, Americans have had a more complex or, one might say, more 
confused relationship with the legacy of the French Revolution. Back 
during the 1790s, Americans were more likely to sympathize with the 
Revolution's repudiation of royal and feudal power and its appeals to 
democracy than to won·y about the suppression of the Catholic Church. In 
1803, President Thomas Jefferson cut a sweet deal with Napoleon for the 
purchase of the Louisiana Territory. And in 1812, the United States found 
itself again at war with France's chief enemy, the British Empire: and the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend. Relatively few Americans have shared, 
say, Abraham Kuyper's nightmarish view of "the catastrophe of 1789." 
Still, Europe's experiment in Christian Democracy offers several 
broad lessons for all Christians engaged in modem politics: 
First, the movement has had the most success when it has held true 
to the "full" Gospel, particularly to Christ's radical command that 
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we love our neighbors as ourselves. Issues of social welfare and 
social justice lie near the heart of true Christian Democracy. 
Second, this movement successfully pioneered ways to funnel 
public health, education, and welfare programs through churches 
and church-related agencies, models that should be of interest to a 
nation now experimenting with faith-based initiatives. 
Third, Christian Democracy has, at its best, carved out a "third 
way" of social-economic policy, independent of both the liberal-
capitalist and socialist mindsets, by being respectful toward family 
life and the health of local communities. 
And fourth, this movement succeeded only so long as it found 
animation in authentic Christian faith and enthusiasm. When those 
diminished, so did the coherence and effectiveness of Christian 
Democracy, and of the modem European nations as whole. 
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